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Abstract
Much of the debate surrounding risk management in information security
(InfoSec) has been at the academic level, and how practitioners view pre-
dominant issues is an important element often left unexplored. Thus, this
article represents an initial insight into the InfoSec risk professionals view
of the field through the results of a 46-participant online study. We analyze
known issues regarding InfoSec risk management (ISRM), especially con-
cerning risk management program development and maintenance, contribu-
tions to business, and challenges within the research field. One of the key
findings from this study was that risk communication is a key skill that likely
needs more emphasis in InfoSec training. Also, we document several issues
concerning security measurements and return on investment for the ISRM
program, together with other relevant paths for future research.
1 Introduction
This paper investigates the practitioners view of research problems within information
security (InfoSec) risk management (ISRM). While there is plenty of available material
regarding what ISRM frameworks contain and how they compare with each other [7],
the literature is scarce regarding the current ISRM industry practices. There are several
known theoretical problems in ISRM[7], however, we do not know if the risk practitioners
agree that these problems are either relevant or representative. Thus, there is the
possibility that existing literature is incomplete and that academia is missing the important
issues. This paper contains the results and analysis from an online survey and represents
a step towards a more holistic picture of ISRM practices.
The main benefit of this paper is new knowledge regarding current practices in ISRM with
emphasis on the risk management part. This study also provides new knowledge regarding
where the research in ISRM should be focusing the efforts, making the ISRM community
and researchers the main beneficiaries of this study. Improving ISRM is essential in
making progress in the InfoSec research field as it is this process that helps determine
organizations determine what and how to protect. Thus, the intended audience of this
paper is InfoSec professionals and academics, together with other ISRM practitioners and
stakeholders.
The main research question investigated in this paper is ”How does the risk management
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problems outlined in previous work [7] reflect problems experienced in the industry?”.
Due to the width of the field, we have narrowed the scope of this research to investigate
industry practices within Risk management, with the following scope:
1. How do industry practitioners view known issues regarding ISRM definitions,
perceptions, development, and maintenance?
2. What do industry practitioners perceive as the biggest contributions of ISRM to the
business?
3. What do industry practitioners consider to be the biggest challenges within ISRM?
The main goal of InfoSec is according to ISO/IEC 27000:2009 to secure the business
against threats and ensure success in daily operations by ensuring confidentiality, integrity,
availability, and non-repudiation. Best practice InfoSec is highly dependent on well-
functioning ISRM processes[2]. While ISRM is the practice of continuously identifying,
reviewing, treating and monitoring risks to achieve acceptance[1]. The issues investigated
in this paper primarily builds on the findings of the survey paper ”A Taxonomy of
Challenges in ISRM” [7], whose main purpose was to categorize and present known
research problems at different stages in the ISRM areas and activities.
The remainder of this article has the following structure. First, we describe the research
method in the form of data collection approach and analysis. Following this is a discussion
of the results in terms of the research questions and implications, including limitations of
this study, and lastly we conclude the paper.
2 Research Method
This study was conducted to investigate ISRM industry practices and the respondents’
views of several known challenges within the research field. 46 participants completed
our online survey which asked about issues from the previously described taxonomy [7].
The first sub-section addresses the choice of data collection method and design to address
the research questions. The second sub-section presents a brief overview of the statistical
methods used for data analysis.
Data Collection - Online Questionnaire
Figure 1: How respondents ranked themselves (x-
axis) and how they were rated in the survey (Y-
axis)
One of the most prominent prob-
lems in InfoSec studies is getting in
touch with the target group and ac-
quiring respondents [4]. One poten-
tial explanation for this is that In-
foSec research is one of the most
intrusive types of organizational re-
search. Also, that there is a general
mistrust of any ”outsider” attempt-
ing to gain data about the actions
of the security practitioner commu-
nity [4]. Thus, non-intrusiveness is
an important requirement when de-
signing the data collection tool. The
narrow target group, industry profes-
sionals, made obtaining respondents
a challenge as the study was subject
to geographical limitations. To overcome said limitations we attempted to recruit partici-
pants from InfoSec risk specialized online forums. We considered this approach as non-
intrusive, and it exposed the survey to many within the target group. However, it presents
several problems; with this strategy the researcher has no control of participants except
that they are members of particular forums, Table 1. We, therefore, included self-rating
questions in the questionnaire for the respondents to rate their knowledge, expertise and
experience, together with our knowledge-based control questions. We designed a classi-
fication scheme based on this information, see Fig. 1.
We designed the questionnaire in Google Forms according to the procedure for develop-
ing better measures [3]. As for the level of measurement, the questionnaire had category,
ordinal, and continuous type questions. Category type questions mainly for demograph-
ics, while the main bulk of questions were designed using several mandatory scale- and
ranking questions. The questionnaire also included several non-mandatory fields for com-
menting on previous questions or just for sharing knowledge about a subject. It had four
pages of questions in total; the first page was demographics and self-rating questions.
The questionnaire consisted of 37 questions in total, with an estimated completion time
of 15-40 minutes depending on how much information the respondent shared. This paper
consists of the results from questions regarding primarily risk management.
Table 1: Groups and Forums where the questionnaire was posted
LinkedIN Forum name Members(at release time)
IT Risk Management 3 443
CRISC (Official) (Certified in Risk and 1 400
Information Systems Control)
Information Security Risk Assessment 441
ISO27000 for Information Security Management 22 620
Information Security Expert Center 8 906
Risk Management & Information Security (Google+) 521
Analysis
We applied a variety of statistical data analysis methods specified in the results, and the
IBM SPSS software for the statistical analysis. A summary of the statistical tests applied
in this research is as follows [5]:
For Descriptive analysis we have considered distributions including range and standard
deviation. On continuous type questions, we applied measures of central tendency
(average) mean, median and mode. We also conducted Univariate analysis of individual
questions, and Bivariate analysis for pairs of questions, such as a category and a
continuous question, to see how they compare and interact (means and standard
deviations). Crosstabulation was applied to analyze the association between two category
type questions, such as ”Company Size” and ”Expertise”. We applied Scatterplot to
visualize two or more continuous type questions.
We have applied Inferential Statistics as a basis for making predictions and determining
significance. The analysis has primarily operated with a standard 95% confidence interval
(CI), but we have also included results withing a 90% and 85% significance, applying
ANOVA for tests of statistical significance. We applied the Turkey post hoc tests to
analyze further statistically significant results between pairs and reveal relationships
between variables. We have applied Pearson Correlation test to reveal relationships
between pairs of continuous type variables.
The questionnaire also had several open-ended questions. We have treated these by listing
and categorizing the responses. Further, we counted the occurrence of each theme and
summarized the responses.
3 Results
This section contains the results of the statistical analysis, starting with demographic data.
Further, we present the results from investigating each research question; firstly, the data
analysis of risk definitions and ISRM perceptions, scope and development. Following
this with the analysis of the main contributions and challenges of the ISRM program.
Figure 2: Respondent demographics, based on
company size (x-axis), industry (Y-axis) and
Continent.
Respondents and Demogra-
phy
The questionnaire was deployed on
specialized InfoSec risk forums on
LinkedIN.com, Table 1, where we
received 46 accepted answers. See
Table 2 for the classification of re-
spondent expertise and work type
(technical or administrative). While
Fig. 2 displays respondent demo-
graphics categorized on company
size, industry, and geographical af-
filiation.
Risk Definitions
We find one of the issues with
the ISRM vocabulary in the many
definitions of what an InfoSec risk is
[7]. So, we provided the participants
with a set of risk definitions from various standards, methods, and literature, and asked
which definition they thought best described an InfoSec risks, Table 3. This issue is
important in determining the philosophical approach to risk, for example if the probability
is central to risk or not. One of the Experts reported that he agreed with the ISO/IEC
Table 2: Classification of Respondents, total 46.
Expert Proficient Competent
Administrative Work 13 10 6
Technical Work 7 7 3
27005:2005 definition, and added: ”... Replace ”the organization” with ”individuals”.”
Whereas another Expert commented: ”My definition of the Risk Management Process
would include this: ”that influences how well they achieve their objectives”.
ISRM perceptions, scope, and development
Responsibility for the ISRM program is important in the context of determining whether
InfoSec is perceived as mostly a technical discipline and an IT issue and importance to
Table 3: Results from asking ”Which definition best describes an InfoSec Risk in your
opinion?”
Definition N % Source
The potential that a given threat will exploit vulnerabilities of an
31 67.4% ISO/IEC 27005:2005
asset or group of assets and thereby cause harm to the
organization. It is measured in terms of a combination of the
probability of occurrence of an event and its consequence.
The Effect of Uncertainty on Objectives 4 8.7% ISO/IEC 31000:2009
Threat * Vulnerability * Asset 4 8.7% Computer and Information
Security Handbook (2009)
((Vulnerability * Threat) / Counter Measure) * Asset Value at
4 8.7% www.IT-Risk-Management.com
Risk
Exposure to the chance of injury or loss; a hazard or dangerous
0 0 % Dictionary.com Definition
chance
Other 3 6.5%
business. We asked the participants who was responsible for the ISRM program in their
organization; the results showed that 54.35% has a CISO/CSO in charge of the program,
and 15.22% of respondents has either the CEO or the Head of IT department in charge.
None of the Experts reported the head of the IT department as responsible for the ISRM
program. However, when we asked them to rate if the ISRM program was mostly run by
the IT department about 50% agreed (answered 4-6) to this Statement, Table 4.
Table 4: Answers to ”Our ISRM program is ran by our IT department” sorted by company
size.
N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error
95% Confidence Interval for Mean
Min Max
ANOVA
Lower Bound Upper Bound
Small 12 2,58 1,832 ,529 1,42 3,75 1 6
Medium 8 3,25 1,488 ,526 2,01 4,49 1 5
Enterpr 26 3,81 1,767 ,346 3,09 4,52 1 6
Total 46 3,39 1,782 ,263 2,86 3,92 1 6 0.14
We asked the participants how important they considered the ISRM process to be in
achieving InfoSec, on a scale 1 (Unimportant) to 10 (Crucial). The results showed a mean
value = 8.6 and Std.Dev. = 1.3. We also asked if the participants thought the cost of
developing and implementing the ISRM program superseded the benefits the respondents
were more divided, mean = 5, Std.Dev.= 2.7, with no significant difference between
groups. This question prompted several comments from the respondents. Notably, three
respondents commented on the difficulties of measuring benefits from an ISRM program
and recommended cost/benefits analysis to make the business case for ISRM. Another
administrative expert commented: ”Any risk management process in use has to be tailored
to the business using it for it to be any sorts of the beneficiary at all. Tailored and actively
in use it will be efficient and beneficiary.” In addition, two experts commented on the
importance and difficulties of keeping ”the big risk picture”, and to ”cope with the large
amount of security measures that comes out of all the ”stand-alone” risk assessments that
are performed.”
The respondents were asked to rank several statements regarding the development and
properties of their ISRM program on a scale from ”1 - Strongly Disagree” to ”6 - Strongly
Agree”, Table 6. All the participants to various degrees based their choice of ISRM
approach on recommendations from Experts or others, showing no significant difference
in responses between company sizes or expertise. The respondents were asked if they
mainly developed their ISRM approach themselves. Only 11% of the respondents agreed
entirely with this statement, with a mean = 3.65 it is evident that most of the respondents’
companies do not primarily develop their own approach to ISRM. Further, we asked if
the respondents ISRM program was based on industry standards, none of the respondents
strongly disagreed to this statement. There were differences between the expertise groups
in this area, Table 5 , the results were statistically significant within 90%, and the Post-Hoc
Turkey test showing significance between the Expert and Competent groups at P=5,5%.
Showing that the Expert group is more likely to apply industry standards for their ISRM
development.
Table 5: Differences in application of industry standards for ISRM program development
N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error
95% CI for Mean
Min Max ANOVA sig.Lower Bound Upper Bound
Competent 9 4,00 1,323 ,441 2,98 5,02 2 6
Proficient 17 4,71 1,263 ,306 4,06 5,36 2 6
Expert 20 5,15 1,089 ,244 4,64 5,66 3 6
Total 46 4,76 1,251 ,184 4,39 5,13 2 6 0.068
The ISRM literature lists several claims regarding the scope of ISRM being too
technical [7]. In support of these claims, we found that 58.6% of the respondents consider
their ISRM program to include mostly technical solutions and ICT. However, 85% of the
respondents reportedly consider Human factor risks as a part of their assessments.
Several actors have previously highlighted the need for data sharing within the InfoSec
domain [7]. We found from our study about 75% of the respondents reports to be reluctant
to share data about their ISRM program with other market actors, while 26% of these 75%
never share data.
We found several correlations in the ratings, for example periodically measuring the
performance of the ISRM program strongly correlates with working on improvements
to the program (Pearson = 0.94), Table 6.
Table 6: Means, Std.Dev & Pearson Correlations between statements on a scale between
1 (Strongly disagree) - 6 (Strongly Agree). X-axis numbers corresponds to numbers on
Y-axis.
Means and Correlations
27 1 27 3 27 4 27 5 27 6 27 7 27 8
27 1 We chose our ISRM approach based on Mean 3,91 Pearson Correlation 1
recommendation from Experts or others Std.Dev 1,244 N 46
27 3 Our ISRM Approach is part of a Mean 3,67 Pearson Correlation 1
larger ERM program Std.Dev 1,77 N 46
27 4 Our ISRM program is based Mean 4,76 Pearson Correlation 0,424** 1
on industry standards Std.Dev 1,251 Sig. (2-tailed) 0,003
N 46 46
27 5 We periodically measure Mean 4,09 Pearson Correlation 0,587** 0,671** 1
the performance of our ISRM program Std.Dev 1,561 Sig. (2-tailed) 0 0
N 46 46 46
27 6 We work to improve our ISRM based Mean 4,11 Pearson Correlation 0,596** 0,655** 0,94 1
on the results from periodic measurements Std.Dev 1,524 Sig. (2-tailed) 0 0 0
N 46 46 46 46
27 7 We share data about our ISRM Mean 2,52 Pearson Correlation 0,393** 0,313* 0,347* 1
program with other market actors Std.Dev 1,362 Sig. (2-tailed) 0,007 0,034 0,018
N 46 46 46 46
27 8 We periodically measure Mean 4,35 Pearson Correlation 0,334* 0,386** 0,693** 0,717** 0,719** 0,334* 1
the efficiency of our security controls Std.Dev 1,303 Sig. (2-tailed) 0,023 0,008 0 0 0 0,023
N 46 46 46 46 46 46 46
27 11 Managing the human factor is Mean 2,35 Pearson Correlation -0,403**
not a part of our ISRM program Std.Dev 1,464 Sig. (2-tailed) 0,006
N 46
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
Choice of industry standard
We got twelve comments on the rating questions, especially regarding the choice of
industry standards. Seven mentioned the ISO/IEC 27000-series as their preferred
approach to ISRM, one respondent reasoned this with ISO/IEC being ”well developed and
mature standard”. Four preferred the NIST-standards, but three of these mentions was as
a supplement to the ISO/IEC standards. Two mentions of COBIT as either supplement
or compliance audits. Others mentioned industry codes of conduct, ISF (IRAMM),
OCTAVE Allegro, DIACAP, and RMF, as their preferred approaches.
Comments on measuring efficiency of the program.
Measuring security is one of the key problems in the InfoSec community [7] and several of
the respondents commented on this issue. One approach described by a tech expert: ”We
have a set of IA controls [Information Assurance] and security technical implementation
guides, each has a test or tests. A scorecard is used to document and evaluate compliance.
Additionally various scanning tools are used. The results of these are put into a risk
assessment report to summarize the risk to the system being evaluated.”
Another approach described by a respondent from the same group: ”Our measurement
is based on the number of incidents as well as a number of deviations from the defined
process. Lesser incidents and lesser deviation from the established process means we are
achieving the results. Also, a non-availability of data via VPN for more than 30 min is
also considered as an incident. The user has to inform the team if a connection fails to
establish for more than 15min Redundancy has been built using multiple channels.”
One administrative expert suggest audit findings, InfoSec events response, and
contingency together with threat intelligence as security measurements and inputs to
the risk assessment. Also, another administrative expert added ”We measure how
many systems have the approval to operate, the percent of systems patched, anti-
virus, system weaknesses identified through assessments, and system log files.” Other
experts mentioned penetration tests and total service efficiency/quality as approaches to
measuring security. The proficient respondents also reports to apply asset availability,
asset reliability, and a number of incidents as measures of security. Another proficient
mention subjective measures of control effectiveness.
Table 7: Perceived contributions of the ISRM program to different areas
N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation
29 1 Asset protection 46 2 6 4,78 1,172
29 2 Compliance with laws and regulations 46 2 6 4,87 1,166
29 3 Improved Corporate competitiveness 46 1 6 3,61 1,483
29 4 Increase Customer base 46 1 6 3,15 1,549
29 5 Increased Production 46 1 6 3,39 1,390
29 6 Managing Security Investments 46 1 6 4,04 1,366
29 7 Mapping ICT Business Criticality 46 2 6 4,37 1,199
29 8 Reliable and Secure Operations 46 2 6 5,02 1,043
29 9 Safeguarding Systems 46 2 6 5,02 1,064
29 10 Safeguarding Employees 46 1 6 4,11 1,479
29 11 Security Management 46 2 6 4,83 1,161
29 12 Threat Intelligence 46 2 6 4,28 1,344
Valid N (listwise) 46
Contributions of the ISRM Program
Applying the scale 1-6, where 1- Not Significant, 6- Very Significant, we asked the
respondents ”How would you rate the contributions of your ISRM program in the
following areas of your organization”, see Table 7 for the descriptive results. Statistically
significant findings are listed in Table 8. We found a significant difference in the views
of ISRM contribution to Increasing Customer Base with regards to company size. The
bigger companies viewed ISRM as more important in increasing the customer base; this
relationship was also found in the correlation analysis with a Pearson = -0.416. Another
significant finding (within 90% confidence) was regarding the Increased Production
statement, the difference in views between the respondents from the smaller companies
and the enterprises. The participants from the smaller and medium companies thought
ISRM to be contributing more to production. Another thing to note is that no one from
the Enterprise-sized companies answered 6 on either questions (29 4 & 5).
Another difference in views from company size was regarding Mapping ICT Business
Criticality, whereas respondents from Enterprises perceive ISRM to have least effect,
inverse Pearson correlation = -0.389. There was also difference in perceptions from the
different expert groups (not significant), both Proficient and Expert respondents had a
mean of 4.5 while the competent group had 3.9. The views on Managing Security
Investments differed between work types, where the respondents with technical tasks
thought of the ISRM program as more important than those with administrative tasks.
Table 8: Statistically significant findings from ISRM contributions
Area and
Class N Mean Std. Dev. Std. Error
95% CI for Mean
Min Max
Post Hoc
ANOVA Lower Bound Upper Bound Turkey Test
29 4 Increase Small 12 4,00 1,758 ,508 2,88 5,12 1 6 Sig.=0.018 Small-Entrp
Customer Base, Medium 8 3,75 1,389 ,491 2,59 4,91 2 6 Sig.=0.117 Med-Enterp
Sig=0.012 Enterpr 26 2,58 1,270 ,249 2,06 3,09 1 5
Total 46 3,15 1,549 ,228 2,69 3,61 1 6
29 5 Increase Small 12 3,92 1,621 ,468 2,89 4,95 1 6 Sig.=0.136 Small-Enterp
production, Medium 8 3,88 1,356 ,479 2,74 5,01 2 6
Sig=0.091 Enterpr 26 3,00 1,200 ,235 2,52 3,48 1 5
Total 46 3,39 1,390 ,205 2,98 3,80 1 6
29 7 Mapping ICT Small 12 5,00 1,348 ,389 4,14 5,86 2 6 Sig.=0.03 Small-Enterp
Business Criticality, Medium 8 4,75 ,886 ,313 4,01 5,49 3 6 Sig.=0.205 Med-Enterp
Sig=0.024 Enterpr 26 3,96 1,076 ,211 3,53 4,40 2 6
Total 46 4,37 1,199 ,177 4,01 4,73 2 6
29 6 Managing Tech Work 17 4,59 1,121 ,272 4,01 5,16 2 6
Sec Investments, Admin Work 29 3,72 1,412 ,262 3,19 4,26 1 6
Sig=0.024 Total 46 4,04 1,366 ,201 3,64 4,45 1 6
Purpose behind doing ISRM work
We asked the participants what they thought were the main purpose behind doing
ISRM work. Twenty-seven participants answered this voluntary written question.
Several respondents listed multiple reasons for doing ISRM; we categorized the answers
into four primary purposes: (i) Fifteen of the respondents answered compliance and
requirements from laws and regulations as the primary reason for doing ISRM work.
(ii) Nine respondents listed protection of the confidentiality, integrity and availability
of assets, personnel, data, etc., as a primary reason for conducting ISRM. (iii) Nine
listed governance and risk management purposes, such as aligning security efforts to
business strategy and goals, balancing investments, and improving decision-making. (iv)
Eight listed maintenance of trust and reputation in terms of internally, partners, and
competitiveness as a primary reason.
Challenges in ISRM practices
We asked the participants what they considered the biggest challenges within ISRM.
Twenty-five respondents answered this voluntary written question. Eleven respondents
mentioned aspects of risk communication issues as a core issue: One predominant issue
was securing the buy-in of management and other stakeholders and securing continuous
funding. This together with difficulties in making the return on investment and benefits
from ISRM visible and lack of understanding of InfoSec risk from management, make up
the main points from answering this question.
In addition, issues with aligning InfoSec efforts with business strategy and goals. For
example, preventing the InfoSec controls from becoming an extra overhead onto normal
operations instead of an inherent part of it, were mentioned as important challenges.
Another highlighted issue was adapting to and dealing with the security issues from new
technology and data mobility. One respondent highlighted human risks as the biggest
challenge: ”Human behavior in this order of priority: 1. Executive non-accountability 2.
Untrained business staff 3. Negligent IT staff 4. Unaccountable middle management 5.
External activity.
4 Discussion
In this section, we discuss our findings with respect to the research questions and their
implications. Starting with risk definitions, responsibilities, development, and security
measurements. Further, this sections discusses our results in terms of main contributions
of and challenges for the ISRM. Lastly, we discuss the limitations of this study.
Our results show that there is broad agreement on what an InfoSec risk is (Table 3). The
preferred ISO/IEC 27005:2005 risk definition is built on the classic Risk = Probability
x Consequence and provides a foundation for a common understanding of InfoSec
risk. This finding is in contrast to InfoSec risk assessment methodologies that have
removed probability from the assessments, such as the OCTAVE approaches and the
new Norwegian Standard 5831:2014. No other scientific disciplines that we are currently
aware of defines risk without probability. Obtaining statistical probability distributions for
InfoSec risks are inherently difficult due to the complexity of the field [6], but qualitative
probability estimates are a viable approach where such data is lacking. This approach is
likely the superior approach compared to avoiding probabilities entirely.
It is clear that the professionals view ISRM as crucial to achieving InfoSec in an
organization. There were conflicting views on if the cost of developing and implementing
the ISRM was worth the results, which indicates that developing a formal ISRM program
creates a lot of overhead. A future path to pursue regarding this is if practitioners consider
ad-hoc risk assessments to be superior to formalized approaches.
Our results indicate that practitioners view InfoSec as more than a technical discipline
(Table 6). We also observed this in the results showing that 70% of the respondents’
organizations had either CISO/CEO or similar roles in charge of the program. The
CISO is ideally placed high in the corporate hierarchy to ensure broad influence to make
InfoSec an organizational responsibility. Concerning responsibility, we also found that
bigger companies are more likely to have the IT department run the ISRM program. One
possible cause for this is that it is easier to include people in smaller companies, as these
are generally more adaptable. Besides, 85% of the respondents reports to include human
factor risks in their assessments, which shows that InfoSec risk assessments are assuming
a more holistic scope than previously assumed [2]. 58.6% reports their programs to
mainly include technical solutions and ICT, which in itself seems sensible since a large
percentage of InfoSec is technical. We, therefore, do not consider these results as
conflicting, but rather parts of a larger picture. Table 6 also shows a significant correlation
(-0.403) between basing the ISRM program on industry standards and managing the
human factor.
There are many InfoSec standards and approaches to choose from and limited data
on which standards are superior to others [7]. Over half of the respondents reports
recommendations from others as deciding factors when it comes to choosing ISRM
approach. One respondent commented that local legislation determines that they have
to apply industry standards/codes of conduct specially developed for the industry. This
aspect has potential for further research, for example if these specialized standards
outperform the more generic approaches.
Our inquiry showed the ISO/IEC 27000-series as popular approaches to ISRM. We also
found that some of the practitioners preferred to use the 27000-series in combination
with other approaches, E.G. NIST, suggesting that there is room for improvement in
the standards. One respondent commented on the need for the supplication of material
for dealing with privacy issues. Choice of ISRM approach is one area that needs more
research, in terms of determining if the differences between them matter for the security
levels of the organization. The differences between expertise groups also showed that
the experts were more likely to rely on industry standards, which is interesting, as we
would expect the situation to be the reverse, perhaps indicating overconfidence in the less
seasoned professionals?
Enterprise risk management (ERM) is a trend where one gathers all risk management
programs into one program. According to the results, this trend has a medium penetration
in the InfoSec community. However, the ISRM program being a part of a larger ERM
correlates significantly with views on measurements, improvements, and data sharing.
One respondent provided an insightful comment on InfoSec in project management: ”We
track all levels of corporate projects to verify we have completed a risk assessment during
the design phase of the project.” This is the spirit of ”an ounce of prevention is worth a
pound of cure”, which has proven repeatedly to be a sensible risk management strategy.
Measuring security is one of the most challenging and vital aspects for improving InfoSec.
We found a significant correlation between basing the program on industry standards and
measuring the performance of the ISRM program (Table 6). There is likely a cause and
effect relationship between these two variables where the emphasis on measurements in
standards guides the InfoSec work. The results from questions regarding periodically
measurements and working with improvement have similar means and are significantly
correlated. The means were relatively high, 4.09-4.35, indicating that the InfoSec
community prioritizes measuring security. The respondents suggested several metrics,
however, one expert respondent had an insightful answer that ensures accountability:
”Measure is - That the management team is actively managing the top 3 risks.”
On the contributions of the ISRM program to business, the results show that the
contribution is largest in safeguarding systems and ensuring reliable and secure operations
(Tables 7 & 8). With compliance, security management, and asset protection viewed as
the second biggest contributions. More interesting are the low scores on the business-
related areas, improved corporate competitiveness, increased customer base and increased
production. One respondent commented ”Increase Customer Base = keep public trust”,
but this perception does not seem to be shared by the majority of our respondents. The
results show significant differences between company sizes, where the respondents from
smaller companies perceive the ISRM program to be contributing more to business related
areas. There can be several reasons for this; for example the size and complexity of
enterprises make the effect of controls less visible. Or employees in larger companies
may view the risk treatments suggested by the ISRM program as a hindrance in daily
operations. While it is easier to communicate the need for and effect of security controls
in smaller companies. Another aspect is the certification regime; where a company needs
certification to qualify for contracts (E.G. PCI-DSS in payment card industry). It is
reasonable to believe that the ISRM program contributes to increasing the customer base
in these cases, but the certifications may not be so popular as to influence visibly the
results in this paper.
We also documented compliance with laws and regulations as the primary driver behind
ISRM. Compliance requirements are useful in establishing a security baseline, but a risk-
based approach should go beyond this and be tailored to manage overall organizational
and operational risks. The risk management aspect was also reflected in our findings
as both asset protection and general risk management/governance were listed secondary
drivers. Maintaining trust and reputation was listed by eight respondents and emphasizes
the public and financial impact a large-scale InfoSec incident can have for a company, and
have become two key assets to safeguard. The main challenges listed by the respondents
concerned risk communication issues, where securing management buy-in and funding
for InfoSec projects were key. Risk matrices have been the target of most of the criticism
of risk communication [7]. However, our results go beyond this, and implicate that
communication and rhetorical skills are something that should have a larger emphasis
on InfoSec training.
Not having a risk occur is a desirable outcome from a risk management process, but
how does one visualize the return on investment in such a case? Several respondents
highlighted this problem, and there is no easy answer to this. Keeping track of incidents
and costs (E.G. annual losses) are popular measurements of InfoSec risk and visualizing
effect. One respondent suggested measurements of service availability as an approach to
visualize ISRM contributions, which is connected to the previously discussed problem of
measuring security and is an area that require more research.
Limitations
While our choice of online survey allowed us to recruit participants from our target group
through specialized web-forums, this approach has some limitations. First of all, our
data are self-reported values based on participants perceptions, while not a substitute for
behavioral and observational data from real-world scenarios, this self-reported data can
still provide valuable insight into day-to-day practices and how practitioners view the
research problems. Furthermore, the study design gave us less control of the research
participants, the control questions somewhat mitigated this problem, but these were not
fool-proof, and circumvention was possible. The sample size was also small, although
the online groups and forums exposed the survey to many potential respondents we only
managed to recruit forty-six in one month. Based on the many members of these groups,
the recruitment strategy was not a success. This outcome could have been caused by
many restricting factors, for example activity in the forums, exposure of the survey, and
questionnaire length. Although the sample had a good geographical spread and diverse
background from the participants, this small sample is also sensitive to outliers.
5 Conclusion
This work has provided an initial insight into InfoSec risk practitioners view of ISRM.
We conclude that the most popular risk definition is the ISO/IEC 27005:2005 version,
which is based on the R=PxC notion. Practitioners also view the ISRM process as
very important, but there were mixed views on whether developing a formal ISRM
program was worth the cost. According to the risk professional, InfoSec is largely
accepted as an organizational responsibility and not just a technical discipline. Although
a large percentage of the respondents’ organizations have managerial positions in charge
of the ISRM program, Company size is one of the determining factors for where the
responsibility for program implementation lie, as larger companies tend to have it ran
by the IT department. The ISO/IEC 27000-series are popular ISRM approaches, but
often in combination with other methods, suggesting that there is room for improvement
in the standard. In terms of program maintenance, we found that measuring security is
one of the most challenging aspects of InfoSec. Where basing the ISRM program on
industry standards correlates positively with systematically working with measurements
and improvements. The biggest contribution of ISRM to business is with safeguarding
systems and ensuring reliable and secure operations. Respondents from bigger companies
did not think the ISRM program to be contributing much to business-related areas, such as
productivity. Compliance with laws and regulations was identified as the primary driver
for doing ISRM work. From the practitioners point of view, the main challenges in ISRM
are various aspects of risk communications. Especially, ensuring buy-in and continuous
funding for InfoSec projects, and visualizing the benefits from the ISRM program, which
highlights the need for risk communication and rhetoric skill training in future InfoSec
training.
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